Ten years after launching the jihad in Nigeria and in the Lake Chad basin region, Boko Haram did not achieve in Cameroon the results it achieved in Nigeria or Niger. Thus, one of the intriguing questions is: why did Boko Haram (relatively) “fail” to expand its caliphate in Cameroon compared to Nigeria where it has controlled territory since several years? In other words, what explains that a (relatively) dysfunctional state like Cameroon was able to oppose a (relatively) efficient security response to Boko Haram?

On a micro level, what are the recruitment and mobilization techniques of Boko Haram in the Far North? Are those techniques specific to the Far North?

The empirical background comprises about 300 semi structured interviews, a hundred unstructured interviews and biographies of Boko Haram fighters, security forces, members of vigilante groups, traditional rulers, elected local representatives, and women.